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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4747
The authors develop and implement a method for 
measuring the frequency of changes in power among 
distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is 
comparable across political systems. The authors find that 
more frequent alternation in power is associated with 
the emergence of better governance in post communist 
countries. The results are consistent with the hypothesis 
This paper—a product of the Growth and the Macroeconomics Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to  study political economy of democratrization. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted 
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at bmilanovic@worldbank.org.  
that firms seek durable protection from the state, which 
implies that expected political alternation is relevant 
to the decision whether to invest in influence with the 
governing party or, alternatively, to demand institutions 
that apply predictable rules, with equality of treatment, 
regardless of the party in power. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is often held in political science and democracy studies that several alternations  in the seat of 
power between genuinely different political groups are needed before democracy is institutionalized 
(Przeworski, 1988; Huntington, 1991).  In this paper we examine whether, after initial 
democratization, political alternation also fosters the establishment of the rule of law.  Whereas 
much recent empirical work on the quality of governance institutions emphasizes the effects of 
geography and history and thus does not identify a path towards improving governance,1 in this 
paper we examine the effect of current political processes on the emergence of the rule of law.  
In order to investigate this question empirically, we develop, for the first time, a 
methodology for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and among 
ideologically distinct groups (parties) that is comparable across political systems.  We do this by 
identifying the locus of power for a range of political regimes, defining what constitutes a change in 
the person or parties that hold power, and finally defining when there is also ideological change in 
persons or parties that hold power.   We use the methodology to investigate the effect of political 
alternation on the quality of governance in 27 postcommunist countries.   
The postcommunist countries are an interesting setting in which to explore the role of 
political alternation.  In going from a command economy to a market economy, an entirely new set 
of rules is required.  Does political alternation hurt or help in establishing those rules?  Intuition 
provides little guidance.  Frequent political alternation would be an impediment to  reform if 
alternation increased the discount rate of politicians or if electoral competition created greater 
motivation or opportunities for corruption.  Many countries in Latin America and elsewhere 
(including Nicaragua, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Honduras, Bolivia and Bangladesh) have been 
                                                 
1Dixit (2005) in his survey of the literature on institutions and growth, wryly concludes:  “Interpreted literally 
as recipes or policy recommendations [for improving governance, the literature would] require a less-
developed country to use plate tectonics to move itself to a more favorable location, or to turn the clock back 
and invite British colonizers, of course cleaning up the local disease environment and getting rid of mineral 
resources and resources suitable for plantation agriculture beforehand.  As a practical matter, these findings 
are merely telling countries to accept their fate” (pp. 4-5).  
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characterized by “alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings …[which] 
seem only to trade the country’s problems back and forth from one hapless side to the other” 
(Carothers, 2002, p. 11)  It is not uncommon to hear that frequent changes in political leadership are 
a binding constraint to sustaining reform momentum, and to hear China mentioned  as a model of 
political stability that facilitated  reforms in institutions of economic governance. 
On the other hand, the Russia scholar Aslund (2002, p. 120) writes that,  
The long tenure of the infirm president Yeltsin…provided Russia with a ‘stability’ that 
favored the corrupt elite.  Poland, the three Baltic countries, and Bulgaria have changed 
governments on average every year for the last decade, and they are among the most 
successful reformers (p. 121). 
 
Consistent with this view, Grzymala-Busse (2003) identifies sharp contrasts in the quality of 
governance and in the institutions that developed in Poland and Hungary, which had frequent 
political alternation, and the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Russia, which were one-party states 
throughout much of the period of her study.  Poland and Hungary established a civil service and 
judicial and enforcement bodies that were insulated from interference by the governing political 
party, and regulated political party funding and made it public.  Russia, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia did not, and in those states, ownership rights were more closely linked to political 
patronage .  In Russia, patronage has led to an outcome where numerous laws provide special 
treatment to a single, named firm (Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya (2004), and corruption has a 
pervasive effect in undermining reform efforts (Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova,  2000; Black and 
Tarassova, 2003)).  
In this paper, we present a simple model of firm behavior that highlights the link between 
expected political alternation and the emergence of the rule of law.  Our key theoretical assumption 
is that firms seek durable protection or favors from the state.  Influential firms can obtain durable 
protection (as private goods) from the governing party or leader when political alternation is low 
and, by doing so, they undermine the credibility of the state as an impartial protector of rights (the 
rule of law).   However, when expected political alternation is high, clientelistic relationships 
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provide little security.   The model predicts that when firms believe that political alternation is more 
likely, they will invest less in influence. 2    
 We test this prediction for the 27 post-communist in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union by constructing a measure of the frequency of change in power among distinct leaders and 
among ideologically distinct groups (parties) that is comparable across political systems.  We use 
lagged cumulative political alternation as a measure of expected future political alternation.3  To 
measure the quality of governance in the post-communist countries, we use the indicator for the 
rule of law constructed by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007; hereafter, 
KKM).  A higher score corresponds to better governance, and the mean and median are normalized 
at zero and the standard deviation at one.  Figure 1 shows that there is great diversity of governance 
outcomes for the post-communist countries relative to the diversity of outcomes in the world.  Post-
communist countries with the highest rule of law scores (Estonia and Slovenia) are in the 75th 
percentile of all countries in the world, whereas those with the lowest scores (Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan) are in the bottom 10th percentile.   
                                                 
2 A related role for political alternation in the quality of governance is studied in Dixit, Grossman and Gull 
(2000).   In their model,  two parties expect to alternate in power indefinitely, and that prospect makes it in 
the self-interest of each party to share wealth broadly rather than privileging their own constituents. 
3 In principle, how alternations are spaced in time should also be taken into account, but in our sample, we did 
not have examples of quick successions in power followed by a long reign (or the reverse),  so that relatively 
little information is lost by considering only the cumulative number of alternations.  
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FIGURE 1.  DISTRIBUTION OF KKM RULE OF LAW SCORE FOR THE WORLD AND POST-COMMUNIST 
COUNTRIES 
 
1996         2006 
 
0
kd
en
si
ty
 ru
le
_l
aw
-2 0 2
rule of law
world post-communist countries
0
kd
en
si
ty
 ru
le
_l
aw
-2 0 2
rule of law
world post-communist countries
 
 
The challenge is to try to identify the role that expected political alternation (measured by 
lagged cumulative alternation) plays in explaining the variation in rule of law scores.  One source of 
difficulty is simultaneity in the relationship between alternation and quality of governance.  
Causation may run in both directions.  Expected alternation may change firm behavior in ways that 
foster the emergence of the rule of law, but greater adherence to the rule of law could increase the 
likelihood of alternation by making elections fairer, or decrease the likelihood of alternation by 
improving outcomes and thus voter satisfaction with the incumbents.    Lagging political 
alternation, as we do, does not fully resolve this problem because the quality of governance in one 
period might affect the quality in later periods. 
A second  difficulty is spurious correlation.   For example, it might be that that the 
opportunity to join the European Union by virtue of proximity to Western Europe causes both high 
alternation and good governance,  and that there is no causal connection between the two.  The 
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opportunity to join the European Union makes a particular set of rules focal and leads individuals to 
anticipate large rewards from coordinating on them, which helps explain the successful transitions 
in those economies.  
To address these issues, we use an instrumental variables approach. We use as instruments 
for political alternation the literacy rate immediately prior to the Communist takeover and the rate 
of urbanization around 1990.  We argue that higher literacy prior to the communist takeover makes 
citizens better able to form independent political judgments about the period of communist rule, and 
better able to form political parties once communism collapses. These factors would tend to 
increase the likelihood of political change in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of 
communism.  We use urbanization as an additional instrument because it should  lower the cost of 
political mobilization and make it easier for  several genuinely different parties to emerge.  Since 
we control for current per capita income, pre-communist education and urbanization are not likely 
to have direct effects on the dependent variable.  We cannot rule out, however, that unobservable 
factors that contribute to pre-communist literacy or urbanization also contribute to higher quality of 
governance today.  
The main empirical findings are as follows.  In OLS and IV regressions, but not in 
regressions with country fixed effects, the quality of governance is significantly positively related 
to lagged cumulative political alternation.   Controlling for per capita income, democracy, war, and 
natural resource wealth, an additional alternation in OLS regressions is associated with an 
improvement in governance by one-third of the post-communist country standard deviation in rule 
of law scores.  In the IV regressions, we find a large influence of cumulative lagged alternation on 
the quality of governance.  The improvement in governance associated with one additional political 
alternation is  now even larger; it is one full standard deviation.  However, because we cannot rule 
out spurious correlation in our instruments, we view our empirical results as suggestive, not 
conclusive. 
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This paper is an exercise in positive political economy,4  which is playing an increasing 
role in the study of economic development.  We test a  simple positive model of investment in 
patronage relationships to ask a normative question about policy (should policy try to expand or 
contract the likelihood of political alternation), which we treat as something that exogenous factors 
can influence.5  In emphasizing in our model demand side rather than supply side factors in the rule 
of law, we are guided by a widely held view among scholars.  As the political philosopher Holmes 
put it, “Putin may sincerely want to introduce the rule of law.  He may repeatedly announce that he 
is going to create it...These subjective intentions are irrelevant, however.  The rule of law is going 
to emerge only if there are strong constituencies supporting it.” (Holmes, 2002, p. 87; see also 
Symposium 1999). Power-sharing compromises in the period immediately following political 
liberalization affect policies, such as electoral rules, public funding of political parties, media 
access, and requirements of supermajorities in parliament, which in turn influence political 
alternation (Przeworski, 1988; Grzymala-Busse 2003, pp. 1135-36).  As long as one believes that 
exogenous factors can influence the choice of such policies,  our empirical results provide 
suggestive evidence suggest that one way to improve governance after an initial period of 
democratization is to adopt measures that increase electoral uncertainty.  
In Section II, we present our model.  In Section III, we describe our measures of political 
alternation.  In Section IV, we discuss the estimation strategy and economic identification.  Section 
V contains the empirical results, and Section VI concludes the paper. 
II.  THE MODEL 
We begin with a discussion of the logic of our model..  Particularly at the early stages of an 
opening to democracy, the political process is easily corrupted.  When civil society, the media, and 
representative institutions are weak and the legal boundaries on corruption are neither well defined 
                                                 
4 One useful definition is Rodrik (1999). 
5 Earlier work examines other policies that can help create—or undermine—the demand for a rule of law,  
including privatization, macroeconomic policy, and controls on international capital flows.  See Black, 
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nor enforced, special interests have few constraints on their ability to buy politicians.  Further, in 
the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communism, the weakness of legal institutions to define 
and protect property rights creates insecurity that pushes firms to look for alternatives.  If that is the 
case, firms, which are under pressure to survive from day to day as well as to make investments 
over the longer run, will tend to shift a significant part of their resources in money and time into 
“investing in influence,” since the returns on influence acquisition will be high.  By investing in 
influence, we mean an activity that is broader than mere bribery or corruption.  The activity also 
includes deals that cannot be strictly ruled illegal, in which a political official uses the power of his 
office to obtain private gain for himself and his clients.6    
The most direct way to break the vicious circle of weak institutions and strong particular 
interests is through alternations in power.  When alternation occurs, the set of political players in 
power changes.  While these players may, in their turn, be beholden to some interest groups, it is 
unlikely that these would be the same interest groups that supported the previous government.  
Thus the rate of return to buying influence for the previous group drops sharply.  But this is not 
merely a replacement of one group of influence-buyers by another.  A more fundamental change 
occurs.  The newly powerful influence-buying groups realize that the same fate may await them 
too.   
The expected return on influence-buying falls if power changes hands and individuals 
revise downward their expectations that any given party will long retain its hold on power—that is, 
if democracy and political alternation become routinized.  Political alternation plays a “signaling” 
function.  If the alternation occurs as a result of an election, then alternation  conveys information 
                                                                                                                                                    
Traakman, and Tarassova (2000) on the first policy, Hoff and Stiglitz (2004, 2008) on the first and second, 
and Qian (1999) on the third. 
6A few examples are illustrative:  (1) In Slovakia, bribery was not illegal under the Mečiar government 
(Grzymala-Busse 2003, p. 1139).  (2) In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, political parties could obtain 
government loans, which were then frequently paid off by business interests (Grzymala-Busse (2003, pp. 
1137-8).  (3) In Russia, the most egregious case of  partiality by the Russian state was the loans-for-shares 
program in 1996.  On a much smaller scale,  Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravaskaya (2004) document the 
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that the rules of the game have changed compared to the old system and that hold on power is time-
bound and obeys precise formal rules.  “Sweet deals” may be rapidly undone—not by the caprice of 
the rulers but by the popular vote.  In a stable authoritarian system, an investor in influence has to 
worry about not offending the ruler and making sure that the ruler lives up to his implicit bargain.  
But in a stable democracy, the bargain is not enforceable even if there is good will on both sides, 
for it could happen that the rulers are thrown out of office.  With political alternation, one set of 
beliefs and institutions would thus be created; without it, an “old” set of beliefs and institutions is 
much more likely to be held and validated.  Until political alternation is routinized, actors may even 
doubt whether the incumbent party or leader will accept defeat in a popular vote and play according 
to the formal rules.7 
If the idea of alternation becomes accepted, firms seeking predictable treatment from the 
state will face the following choice:  either to try to influence the entire political spectrum of 
parties, or to forsake clientelistic relationships with political parties.  Some, of course, may pursue 
the first strategy.  Yet this may be a very costly option:  it means paying for preferential treatment 
more than once.  Further, unless the differences among the political parties are slight, ideological 
divides may make some clientelistic relationships infeasible (e.g., an avowedly free trade party will 
be more difficult to bribe for protectionist legislation; a nationalist party is less likely to accept 
bribes from a minority group that seeks preferential access to state contracts).  Thus, we would 
expect that more frequent alternations in power between different groups would weaken the market 
for influence.  It would also weaken the incentives to invest effort in destroying nascent institutions 
that would restrain arbitrary action by the state.  In these ways, we would expect more frequent 
                                                                                                                                                    
common occurrence of legislation providing benefits to only a single named firm. See also Varese (2001, chs. 
1-2 ).  
7 Uncertainty regarding the stability of democracy characterized, for example, the transitions in Spain (recall 
Tejero’s attempted coup), Portugal, and Greece.  An overview of all countries that experienced a movement 
away from authoritarianism in the past thirty years concludes that, “By far the majority…have not achieved 
relatively well-functioning democracy or do not seem to be deepening or advancing whatever democratic 
progress they have made” (Carothers, 2002, p. 9). 
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alternations in power to support the slow legal process that is entailed in creating a rule-of-law 
state.    
To capture this intuition, it suffices to use a two-period model that incorporates two general 
features of investing in influence.  First, the payoff is obtained in a lengthy (more than one-period) 
process.  Our focus is on “grand corruption,” situations where firms purchase rules of the game that 
privilege their own interests, protection from competitors, favorable judicial decisions, the right to 
make privatization bids, and so on.  Such privileged protection or access normally entails 
government actions that occur over time; they are not one-off deals.  In our model, investors in 
influence seek to obtain a durable good from influential politicians.8   
The second feature is that corruption contracts are enforced only as long as the political 
patron remains in power.  If there is a change in the seat of  power, the investor will lose his 
privileges and incur  an additional  a loss, which might take the form of a loss on sunk investments 
or a punishment imposed by a successor government.  Russia’s experience illustrates the 
vulnerability to political risk of business empires based on politically protected property rights.  
Braguinsky (2008, esp. Figure 1) finds that among the 300 oligarchs judged by experts as most 
influential in Russia in 1995, the peak period of separation of owners from the assets they 
controlled occurred in the three-year period (1998-2001) that included  the 1999 transfer of power 
from Yeltsin to Putin, and that 43 percent of the oligarchs expropriated when Putin was in power 
faced punitive actions in 2000-2005 (including criminal investigations, jail, forced immigration, 
and assassination).   
 If there is no change in the seat of power, then we assume that the contract is fulfilled.  We 
do not model how the contract is enforced.  It could be self-enforcing in a scenario of repeated 
                                                 
8Thus, we assume that politicians also have a two-period time horizon.  This assumption might not hold in 
highly politically unstable countries;  Bates (2004) writes that in Angola and Liberia, the time horizon of 
politicians is so short that they do not in general sell property rights protection; anything that government can 
easily appropriate, it loots. But in the transition countries, the sale of property rights (as a private good) is 
well documented; see, e.g, Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2003). 
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interactions,9 or it could be enforced by the threat of sanctions from a network of firms.10  The 
specific assumptions of the model are described below. 
Set-up of the model 
Consider an economy where there are a large number (a continuum of mass one) of firms, 
which differ in their ability to invest in influence with the governing political party to obtain 
privileged protection from the state.  θ  denotes a firm’s ability to invest in influence.  θ is 
distributed according to the continuous, differentiable cumulative distribution function H(.), with 
H(.) > 0 for θ >0.  In the real world, many factors would give rise to differences across firms in the 
ability to earn “influence-rents”:  political or personal closeness to the powerful officials, links of 
friendship or kinship, the size of the enterprise (larger firms have more bargaining power and 
control more resources), and membership in a network of firms that can enforce bargains between a 
firm and the state.   
Each firm has an opportunity to make one bargain (a “corruption contract”) with the 
political party in power.  In the bargain, the party uses its de facto authority to create rents by 
enforcing property rights selectively (as a private good) or extending other privileges.  The firm 
must decide whether or not to act.  If it does not act, it receives a return normalized at zero.  If it 
invests in influence and the party remains in power in the second period, then the firm receives a 
net return R>0 in this period and the next.  But if the party loses office, then in the second period, 
the firm will suffer a loss .  R is the return that shares the rents from the “corruption contract” 
between the politician and the firm according to the Nash or some other bargaining solution.  R 
l
                                                 
9A case in point is reported in Freeland (2000, ch. 12):  In 1997, one of those who had helped ensure 
President Yeltsin’s reelection in exchange for the “loans-for-shares” arrangement believed that the 
government had not given him a fair share of state assets.  He threatened to block—and did block—actions 
that Yeltsin wished to take by exposing corruption.  The revelations were a factor in delegitimizing Yeltsin’s 
administration.  An additional class of enforcement devices, which is important in practice but cannot be 
captured in a two-period model, are reputational concerns:  parties who expect to stay in power or return to 
power have an interest in being able to enter into clientelistic arrangements in the future. 
10Haber et al. (2003) argue that, in Mexico, networks of manufacturing firms control labor unions, which play 
the role of third-party enforcer of promises.  If the party violates a promise with a member of the network, the 
network can call a general strike and bring down the government.  
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depends on a firm’s type (firms with a higher value of θ earn a higher net return to investing in 
influence) and also on the institutional constraints on rent-seeking from the state, such as the 
separation of powers, denoted by ρ.  We assume that these institutions constrain the ability to 
extract rents from the state more for those with a higher value of θ.  Formally,: 
(1) );( ρθR   with   .0R = ,0,0 ≤<> θρρθ RRR    
We use subscripts to denote partial derivatives, so Rθ  denotes ∂R/∂θ.  
Given these assumptions, the expected payoff  v to investing in influence is  
(2) v(θ, π; ρ) = R(θ; ρ) + δ{[1-π]R(θ, ρ) - π l }, 
where δ is the discount factor and π is the probability that the governing party loses power at the 
end of the first period.  The first term gives the first period’s return, which occurs with certainty.  
The second term gives the second period’s expected return, which depends on the probability of 
change in the group that holds effective power.11   
We are now ready to consider the firm’s decision whether or not to invest in influence.  The 
payoff to investing in influence is increasing in the firm’s type, θ, as depicted in Figure 2.   For a 
given value of π, monotonicity of v in θ implies that there exists a unique critical value or switch 
point, , such that firms with θ > invest in influence and firms with θ < do 
not.   is the type that is indifferent between investing and not investing in influence, and  is 
implicitly defined by 
);(ˆ ρπθ
);(ˆ ρπθ
);(ˆ ρπθ );(ˆ ρπθ
(3)    v( ,π; ρ) = 0. θˆ
                                                 
11 Preferential treatment obtained by some firms may impose a cost on other firms through unfair competition 
and poorer public-goods provision, as Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya (2004) show has occurred in 
Russia.  As a result, the relative return to each firm to investing influence (relative to not doing so), may be 
increasing in the number of others who invest in influence.  Our model abstracts from this possible effect, but 
taking it into account would strengthen our results because of a social multiplier effect. 
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FIGURE 2.  FIRMS DIFFER IN THE ABILITY TO INVEST IN INFLUENCE, AND THE PAYOFF IS 
POSITIVE FOR TYPES  .θˆθ >
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Firms above the switch point, of which there are a fraction 1-H( ),  invest in influence.  We denote 
this fraction by x: 
θˆ
(4)    )).;,(ˆ(1 ρθπθHx −=
We now derive comparative statics results.  Consider the effect of a change in beliefs about 
the probability of political alternation.  An increase in π lowers the expected return to investing in 
influence, which increases the switch point, so fewer firms invest in influence.  Figure 3 provides 
the basic insight:  the switch point moves from  to .  Formally, we have  );(ˆ 1 ρπθ );(ˆ 2 ρπθ
(5)                        0
]1[
])ˆ([ˆ >−+
+=−= δπδ
θδ
π
θ
θθ
π
R
R
v
v
d
d l
, 
and the resulting reduction in the proportion of firms that invest in influence is  
(6)     .0
ˆ
)ˆ( <′−= π
θθπ d
dH
d
dx
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Total expected rents to firms that invest in influence are 
.  This function is decreasing in π:  ∫∞= );(ˆ )();,(ρπθ θρπθ dHvM
(7)                .0])([);,ˆ( ˆ <+−−= ∫ ∞θ θδρπθπ dHRvddM l  
Expected rents fall because the marginal firm investing  in influence drops out and because the 
inframarginal firms forgo second-period rents, R, and suffer a loss, .   l
 
FIGURE 3.  AN INCREASE IN PROBABILITY OF ALTERNATION (π) LOWERS THE RETURN ON 
INVESTING IN INFLUENCE  AND RAISES THE SWITCH POINT ( )   .θˆ
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)(ˆ 1πθ   )(ˆ 2πθ
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 Under what circumstances does electoral uncertainty have a large influence on investment 
in influence?  Electoral uncertainty is a more important restraint on investing in influence, the 
weaker the institutional constraints (ρ) on rent-seeking.  In this model, the two are substitutes  It is 
likely to be particularly strong in the postcommunist countries because new beliefs about expected 
alternation are formed in that period, new political parties emerge, and restraints on influence-
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buying are weak.   Formally, dx/dπ  and dM/dπ  decrease in absolute value with an increase in ρ, 
the restraints on rents:12 
(8) 0
]1[
])ˆ([
)ˆ( 2 <−+
++′= δπδ
θθδ
θ
θρθρ
ρπ R
RRRR
Hx
l
   
(9) .0)ˆ(
ˆ
<+−= ∫∞ dHRRvM
θ
ρρρπ δθ    
The decreases in dx/dπ and/or dM/dπ  are greater, the greater the effect of institutional constraints 
on rents (i.e. the greater is Rρ  and thus νρ ), the greater the marginal rents ( the flatter the 
slope of R(θ;ρ) with respect to θ, and the more an increase in ρ  flattens that slope (Rθρ ). 
)),ˆ(θR
 In summary, the model makes the following predictions:  
a. An increase in expected alternation in power reduces the proportion of firms that  invest in 
influence and the aggregate rents that they obtain. 
b. These effects are stronger when the institutional constraints on rent-seeking are weaker.  
Thus, the impact of alternation on the quality of governance will be weaker, if it exists at 
all, in countries with strong governance institutions. 
c. Good governance is more likely to occur when there are only limited rents that powerholders 
can extract from the rest of society.  Thus, it is more likely when a smaller share of a country’s 
GDP is in the form of exports of natural resources that require no processing and can be sold 
on thick international markets, where they are hard to trace.  
Our model of investing in influence is a short-run model in which weak institutions shape 
the terrain in which firms adapt as a function of the expected probability of alternation in the seat of  
                                                 
l12 An effect that might seem to go the other way in our model is that an increase in would make expected 
returns to rent-seeking more sensitive to π.  But in a richer model, we would take into account that for 
institutional constraints (ρ) sufficiently large, the civil service and judiciary would be insulated from the 
reach of the dominant party and so punishment would be independent of political alternation.   
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power.   In the long run, firms’ behavior reshapes the institutions so that, as emphasized in 
equations (8) and (9), the effect of alternation on governance differs across countries, and the cross-
country regressions that we analyze here would be too blunt an instrument to test the predicted 
effect of political alternation.  
III.  DEFINING AND MEASURING ALTERNATION IN POWER 
 Testing the theory calls for relating measures of expectations about the probability of 
political alternation, to indicators of the quality of governance.  We do not observe expectations, 
but certain events that occur during political liberalization may have a large effect in shaping 
expectations and thus proxy for expectations.  We assume that the greater the number of 
alternations in power since the onset of political liberalization, the greater the expectation of 
political alternation in the current period.  We have constructed measures of political alternation for 
all 27 post–communist countries for which data are available.  The measures represent hypothetical 
answers to the question, What kinds of political turnover are likely to render “corruption contracts” 
unenforceable?  
To define political alternation in a meaningful way, we need to decide three things:  Where 
is the seat of power in the national government?  What constitutes a change in the occupant of the 
seat of power?  When can this change be said to constitute a change in ideology, e.g., a left-wing 
coalition replacing a right-wing coalition?  We consider each question in turn. 
In identifying the seat of power, we distinguish authoritarian, presidential democratic and 
parliamentary democratic systems.  At a given point in time, authoritarian countries are countries 
whose  democracy scores are less than or equal to  -4  according to the Polity2 variable from the 
PolityIV data base.  The Polity2 score ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy).  It 
is derived by subtracting a scale of autocracy (0 to 10) from a scale of democracy (0 to 10).  
(Democracy and autocracy are distinct indicators; they do not have common components; see 
Marshall and Jaggers, 2000, p.  14.)   
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The remaining (non-authoritarian) countries are divided into two groups--presidential 
democracies and parliamentary democracies-- based on whether there is a presidency that possesses 
significant law-making power.  Presidential democracies have “strong presidents,” defined as 
having either decree powers or veto power that can be overridden only by legislative 
supermajorities.   Parliamentary democracies are non-authoritarian states without strong presidents. 
  Once the locus (seat) of power is identified, we have to define what constitutes a change in 
the actor who holds power.   We count personal changes in the locus of power.  In authoritarian 
states, this is a change in the ruler.  In democracies,  a change is counted when control of all veto-
wielding legislative houses changes.  What happens if there is a broad change in the governing 
coalition in a legislative house, but one or more small parties remain from the old governing 
coalition?  We count a change only if at least two-thirds of the seats of the new governing coalition 
are held by parties that were not part of the old governing coalition.  In presidential democratic 
systems, the president, too, must change.  A change of control of some but not all of the relevant 
veto-wielding institutions is not counted.   
For example, if control of a unicameral legislature shifts and the presidency is not strong, 
this counts as a political alternation.  If control of a unicameral legislature shifts but the holder of a 
strong presidency does not, this does not count as a change.  If a new president is elected but 
control of the legislature does not change, then again this does not count as a change.  On the other 
hand, if a change in all the  law-making institutions of the state is completed over more than one 
electoral cycle, the change is coded as having occurred in the year that the change in control 
becomes complete.  Thus, if control of the presidency changed in an earlier election and has not 
changed since and, in the current election, control of the legislature shifts to parties supportive of 
the president, then one change is counted as having occurred in the current election.   
As shown in Table 1, no alternation in the seat of power occurred in Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  How are scores of zero possible?  Why doesn’t the collapse of the 
USSR automatically count in our measure of alternation for all the Soviet successor states?  Our 
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coding principle is that the first successor state government must be a new ruler in its republic to be 
counted as a change.  If such a new institutional ruler did come to power, the change is coded as 
occurring in the year that he began to wield effective authority in the republic—either 1990 or 
1991.  The collapse of the Soviet Union did not involve an alternation in the holder of the seat of 
power in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  For the same 
reason, no alternation is counted as having occurred in 1991 in Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia 
with the break-up of Yugoslavia. In Appendix Table A-1, we list the 27 post-communist countries 
in our data, along with their cumulative alternation scores by year 2006. 
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR TWO MEASURES OF ALTERNATION IN THE TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES, UP TO AND INCLUDING YEAR 2006 
 
  Cumulative 
political 
alternation 
Cumulative 
ideological 
alternation 
Mean 2.71 1.93 
Median 3 1.5 
Minimum 0a 0b 
Maximum 5 4 
Countries with 
the maximum 
Lithuania 
Slovakia 
Lithuania 
Slovakia 
Bulgaria, 
Hungary 
Macedonia 
Correlation with 
cumulative 
political 
alternation  
1 0.84 (0.00) 
Note:   
a. Countries are Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.   
b. Countries are those in note a. plus Belarus and  Tajikistan.   
c. Correlation is calculated across all years.  p-value is in parentheses. 
 
 An obvious refinement, which we call ideological alternation, is to count only those 
political alternations in which the shift of power also entails a shift of ideology.  In the latter case, 
alternation may be more likely than in the form case to entail an end to the privileged government 
treatment that select groups of businesses enjoyed under the predecessor regime.   In order to define 
what constitutes an ideological alternation, we use a new database on political institutions, the Post-
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Communist Party Ideology database developed by Horowitz and Browne (2005).  Ideologies of 
governments are here understood in terms of the positions of ruling individuals, groups, or parties 
on the most salient policy issues.  Following the tradition of much applied work in comparative 
politics, we use a two-dimensional policy space, where one dimension captures left-right 
differences in economic ideology-cum-policy, and the other dimension captures differences in 
“national identity” policies.  In economic policy, the main issue that faced the post-communist 
world in its first dozen years was whether, and how, to make the transition from planning or market 
socialism to capitalism.  In debates over national identity, the main policy issues concerned the 
status and treatment of internal ethnic minorities and of ethnic groups in neighboring countries.  To 
code leaders and parties, we use criteria described in Appendix A and Horowitz, Hoff and 
Milanovic (forthcoming) to distinguish four intervals along each of the two ideology-cum-policy 
dimensions; see Table 2. The number in each cell represents total country/years that ideologically 
different parties or coalitions were in power over the period 1989-2006.  For example, center-left 
parties were in power for 188 country/years or almost 39 percent of country/time.  
TABLE  2.  IDEOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION SCHEME FOR PARTIES CONTESTING ELECTIONS IN POST-
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, AND NUMBER OF COUNTRY/YEARS RULED BY DIFFERENT REGIMES 
 
Economic ideology 
National identity policy 
Far Left Center-Left Center-Right Far Right 
Extreme Nationalist 0 0 0 0 
 
Moderate Nationalist 
 
66 
 
 
188 
 
229 
 
0 
Moderate Autonomist 3* 
 
0 0 0 
Secessionist 
 
0 0 0 0 
Note.  Total number of country/years is 18 years times 27 countries = 486.   
*Moldova 2001, 2002, and 2003.    
 
 
TABLE 3.  CONSTRUCTION OF THE CUMULATIVE ALTERNATION MEASURES IN HUNGARY AND RUSSIA 
 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 
Hungary                   
Political alternation  1    2    3    4     
Ideological alternation  1    2    3    4     
Ideology F R R R R L L L L R R R R L L L L L 
Political system 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Russia                   
Political alternation   1        2        
Ideological alternatio  
 
n 1                  
Ideology  F F F R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Political system 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 
Notes: Ideologies are F = far left, L = center-left, R = center-right .   Political systems are 1=parliamentary, 2=presidential, 3=authoritarian. 
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Table 3 illustrates the construction of alternation indices for Hungary and Russia. Hungary 
is a parliamentary democracy with unicameral legislature and a weak presidency., and so only 
changes in control of the legislature are relevant for measuring political alternation.  Through the 
end of 2006, parliamentary elections brought new ruling parties or party coalitions to power in 
March 1990 (center-right), May 1994 (center-left), May 1998 (center-right), and April 2002 
(center-left).  All of these political alternations brought ideologically different parties or coalitions 
to power, so that there is no difference between the value of our measures of political and 
ideological alternation.   
Russia has had a Polity2 score above -4 throughout the period of our analysis (Polity2 score 
= 4 until 1999, and 7 beginning 2000).  We characterize it as a strong presidency, and so changes 
must occur in both the presidency and the legislature to be counted as an alternation in the seat of 
power.  The first political alternation occurred in August 1991, when the failure of the hard-line 
communist coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev transferred effective power to Boris Yeltsin 
and the Russian legislature and led to the break-up of the Soviet Union.  President Yeltsin remained 
in power until December 1999, when he resigned in favor of Vladimir Putin.  As prime minister, 
Putin had led his United Russia Party to success in the December 1999 lower house elections.  
Thus, in December 1999, a full political alternation was completed as a new president and a 
supporting lower house coalition came to power.  The regionally selected upper house, founded in 
1996, had its selection principles amended to guarantee support for Putin.  Through 2006, this late 
1999 political alternation was the only one since August 1991.  Putin and his supporting 
parliamentary coalition are not classified as having a different ideology from Yeltsin and his 
supporting coalition, so there is no ideological alternation in 1999.   
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IV.   EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Figure 4 shows the scatter plot of cumulative political alternations in 1989-95 and the rule 
of law score in 2006 in post-communist countries.  The figure shows that large differences in the 
rule of law score are associated with each additional political alternation; the simple correlation 
between rule of law in 2006 and cumulative political alternation  is 0.73.13  Every country that had 
at least three political alternations by 1996 (inclusive of  1996)  has a rule of law score in 2006 
above the world average.    
Figure 5 presents the same data in a different way.  We divide the post-communist 
countries into two groups, those with  at most one political alternation by the end of 1996 and those 
with two or more.  For each group, the figure plots the kernel density of the rule of law score in 
2006.  The first group had an average score of -0.83, while the second had an average score around 
0, 14 and the two distributions do not overlap very much at all.  
.  
                                                 
13 The use of an alternative governance measure (control of corruption) and alternation measure (ideological 
alternation) yields virtually identical results to the ones shown in the figure.     
14 The t-test rejects equality of the means.  
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FIGURE  4.  CUMULATIVE  POLITICAL ALTERNATION BEFORE 1996 AND RULE OF LAW 
IN 2006 IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 
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FIGURE  5.  KERNEL DENSITY FUNCTIONS OF 2006 RULE OF LAW SCORE 
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Note:  The means are shown by the two vertical lines.  
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 Our model identifies a role for expected political alternation as a restraint on 
“corruption contracts” in countries with weak formal constraints on corruption.  We measure 
cumulative political alternation between 1989 and year t, where t ∈ {1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006}15 and use that measure as a proxy for expectations as of time t of political 
alternation in the future.  We treat the period 1996-2006 as one “slice of time.”  Our hypothesis is 
that the cumulative number of political alternations  is positively related to governance indicators.  
We estimate the reduced form equation, 
(10)       itiititit ALTGOV εγββ ++ΓΧ++= '10
where the subscripts i and t index, respectively, countries and years.  itΧ is a vector of covariates 
and  iγ  are  country dummies.  ALTit is cumulative political or ideological alternation 
(“alternation,” for short). 
The dependent variable is the KKM rule of law measure.16  It is defined as the extent to which 
agents have confidence in, and abide by, the rules.  The measure focuses on the quality of contract 
enforcement and property rights.  Among the available governance measures, we believe that this 
measure captures most closely the phenomena with which we are concerned—the quality of 
governance affected by the exercise of political power. The KKM data are composite indicators based 
on pre-existing sources, which include expert surveys and estimates by government, NGOs, and credit 
rating agencies.  Since, as discussed above, the indicator is scaled so that the average and median value 
for the world is 0, a country’s score gives its relative position in the world.  However, among those 
pre-existing data sources that are measured in absolute terms, there is no clear time trend between 1996 
and 2006.  Thus, KKM conclude that the measures for each country over time can be read as absolute 
changes.  Relative to the world as a whole, there is a slight upward time trend in the mean rule of law 
                                                 
15 This set is all years for which KKM measures of governance were available. 
 
16 Later we also use another KKM measure, control of corruption.  
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indicator for the post-communist countries:  the mean is  -0.44 in 1996, -0.42 in 2000, and about -0.35 
in 2004-2006, where a unit is a standard deviation for the world. 
On the right-hand side of (10), we have ALT and a number of other variables that previous 
work has found to influence the quality of governance:  level of income (we use GDP per capita at 
in 1990 so that we do not capture the effect of what we are trying to predict----governance--on the 
predictor variable—income), the extent of democracy (proxied by the Polity2 variable running from 
-10 to +10), cumulative years of war, share of fuel exports in GDP, 17 and the number of years of 
communist rule.18  Table 4 presents summary descriptive statistics, and Appendix B gives the 
sources and exact definitions of the variables. 
 
TABLE 4.   DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SELECTED VARIABLES, POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 
 Mean Standard deviation 
Rule of lawa -0.390 0.669 
Control of corruptiona -0.400 0.650 
GDP per capita in 1990 in 
natural logs, $PPP  
8.87 0.59 
Fuel exports as share of GDP 
in 1996-97 
0.047 0.103 
Democracy (Polity2 score)a  3.68 6.63 
Years of communism 55.2 13.3 
Pre-communist literacy (% of 
adult population) 
55.2 30.2 
Urbanization rate in 1989-90 
(in percent) 
56.2 12.3 
aFor the period 1996-2006.  
 
 We investigate whether alternation has an influence on the quality of governance 
controlling for democracy and number of years of Communist rule.  Therefore we use all three 
                                                 
17 We use the earliest year available for fuel exports (1996 or 1997) in order to abstract from endogeneity 
between (bad) governance and dependence on fuel exports. 
18 Regarding democracy, see e.g. Treisman (2002) for transition economies and Goldsmith (1999) and Lipset 
and Linz (1999) for a general treatment.  A large literature on the “natural resource curse” points to a variety 
of reasons why a high share of GDP from natural resource exports, such as fuel, which requires little or no 
processing, would lead to worse governance—see, e.g., Robinson et al. (2006) and Murshed (2004).  For the 
impact of the political system, including communist rule, on governance, see e.g Lederman, Loayza and 
Soares (2005).  
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variables in our empirical analysis.  These variables measure distinct aspects of the political 
process:  Democracy can coexist with infrequent alternation in power, as long rules of Social 
Democrats in Sweden (1936-76) and Liberal Democrats in Japan (1955-93) attest.  However, in our 
sample, in which political liberalization is recent, the correlation between cumulative alternation 
and the level of democracy is +0.68 to +0.69 (see Table 5).  The correlation between cumulative 
alternation by year 2006 and the number of years of Communist rule experienced by a country (in 
the past) is strongly negative, between -0.77 and -0.78.  
             TABLE 5.  CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL VARIABLES 
 Cumulative 
political 
alternation  
Cumulative 
ideological 
alternation 
Number of 
observations   
Democracya 0.68 
(0.00 
0.69 
(0.00) 
475 
Number of years of 
Communist ruleb  
-0.77 
(0.00) 
-0.78 
(0.00) 
27 
Note:   p-values are in parentheses.   
a. Calculated across all years.  Each observation is a country/year.     
b. Calculated for the year 2006 only.   
 
The inclusion of democracy on the right-hand side of our regression together with 
alternation is likely is impart a downward bias to alternation.  Alternation influences the coziness of 
relationships between firms and the state, and that, in turn, influences both our dependent variable 
(GOV) and the level of democracy.  Some of the effect of alternation may thus be ascribed to the 
democracy variable.   
 A central difficulty in our analysis is that alternation is itself an endogenous variable.  
There may be two-way causation between alternation and the rule of law.  It may be that better 
governance in any given year expands political competition, which increases political alternation 
and also has persistent effects on the quality of governance.  Then the measured influence of 
alternation would reflect a simultaneous influence between alternation and governance.  The 
influence of governance on alternation could also go the other way, if more corrupt governments 
are more likely to lose power.  To abstract from simultaneity, we use as instruments for alternation 
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two variables:  the level of literacy in the country prior to Communist rule and the level of 
urbanization around the time of regime change, in 1989-91.  The logic is as follows.  Higher level 
of literacy denotes greater sophistication of the public and greater ability to judge the programs and 
accomplishments of different parties.  More informed voters compared to “machine-politics” are  
likely to produce greater number of turnovers in government.  On the other hand, higher literacy is 
no guarantee of greater probity, either in government or in ordinary life.  Thus we do not predict a 
direct influence from greater literacy in the pre-communist period and better governance.  
However,  we have not modeled  the historical forces that gave rise to higher literacy in the pre-
communist period.  We cannot rule out that those forces persisted during some 50 to 70  years of 
communist rule that most of the countries in our sample experienced, and that they contributed to 
better governance outcomes after communism collapsed. 
The level of urbanization in 1989-1990 is introduced as an additional instrument on the 
assumption that political mobilization is more easily achieved in urban areas.  More urbanized 
countries can be expected to have a politically more engaged populace, which could also be a factor 
in more frequent alternation of government.  Since we control for income per capita (which is 
strongly correlated with urbanization), we do not expect any direct link between greater 
urbanization and better (or worse) governance.   
V.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The first three columns of Table 6 present regressions with the KKM rule of law score as 
the dependent variable.  So as not to understate the standard errors, the p-values are based on 
standard errors corrected to take into account correlation in the error term across years in a given 
country.  It turns out that no important differences arise when we replace political alternation with 
ideological alternation.  Therefore we report only the effect of political alternation.   
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TABLE 6.  OLS AND IV ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL 
ALTERNATION 
Note: *** Significant at 1 percent.  ** Significant at 5 percent.  * Significant at 10 percent. 
Rule of law Control of corruption 
Pooled OLS 
 
Fixed effects IV Pooled OLS Fixed effects 
 
IV 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
0.222*** 0.034 0.714*** 0.203** -0.001 0.633*** Alternation 
 (0.002) (0.311) (0) (0.007) (0.982) (0) 
0.591**  0.997*** 0.637***  0.916*** GDP per  
capita in 1990a (0.007)  (0) (0.003)  (0) 
GDP per capita  0.244**   0.431**  
  (0.036)   (0.009)  
-0.111* -0.128 -0.120** -0.100** -0.261 -0.098** War 
(cumulative) (0.071) (0.557) (0.02) (0.045) (0.396) (0.03) 
-5.00*  -14.34*** -6.265**  -13.89*** Fuel/GDP in 
1996-97 (0.055)  (0.001) (0.014)  (0) 
Fuel/GDP   -0.378   -1.317**  
  (0.300)   (0.012)  
-0.011  0.013 -0.010  0.011 Communist years 
 (0.247)  (0.389) (0.268)  (0.427) 
-0.030 0.004 -0.118*** -0.035* 0.009 -0.109*** Democracy 
(Polity2) (0.159) (0.623) (0) (0.088) (0.396) (0) 
-5.112** -2.388** -10.46*** -5.526** -3.869** -9.606*** Constant 
(0.011) (0.018) (0) (0.006) (0.007) (0) 
R2 adjusted 
F  
0.733 
29.57 
0.127 
3.67 
0.416 
26.36 
0.707 
22.56 
0.105 
2.95 
0.452 
22.06 
Number of 
observations 183 156 183 183 156 183 
F test of excluded 
instruments   
--- --- 11.50 --- --- 11.50 
Hansen J statistic   0.041 
(0.84) 
  0.27 
(0.60) 
p values shown between parentheses. “0” indicates p=0.000. 
 a. In natural logs. 
 
 
 
Column 1 reports the results of pooled cross-sectional and time series regressions without 
country fixed effects.19  One additional alternation is associated with a significant improvement in 
the rule of law score (p-value = 0.002).  The estimated coefficient of  0.22 means that in our 
sample, an increase of one political alternation is associated with one-third of a standard deviation 
                                                 
19 When we regress residuals from the pooled regression against time, they display no time trend.  This 
provides justification for treating the time-ordered cross section observations for 1996-2006 as independent. 
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increase in the rule of law score among post-communist countries.  The only other factor in column 
1 that is significantly associated with the quality of governance is the pre-transition income level.  
Each 10 percent increase in 1990 per capita GDP is associated with an increase in the rule of law 
score of  about 0.06 (that is about one-tenth of post-communist countries’ rule of law standard 
deviation).  
Column 2 reports the effect of adding fixed country effects.  It shows that adding fixed 
effects makes the estimated coefficient very small (0.03) and statistically insignificant (p= 0.31).  
Thus, controlling for the observable characteristics emphasized in the earlier literature as well as 
unobservable country effects, political alternation has the expected sign but is not significant.  We 
interpret this to mean that unobservable (or difficult to quantify) country-specific characteristics 
play a very important role in determining both governance and alternation.  Besides the country 
fixed effect, the only regressor that is statistically significant at a conventional level in this 
regression is per capita GDP.  In our other regressions20, and also a robust finding in earlier studies, 
is that income has also been found to be strongly correlated with lower corruption, although the 
direction of causation is unknown.    
To shed light on the causal influence of alternation on governance, we instrument for 
political alternation in the regression reported in column 3, Table 6.  As discussed above, we use as 
instruments the literacy rate prior to the Communist takeover and the rate of urbanization around 
1990.  Literacy is a plausible instrument for political alternation because the potential for civic and 
political culture to emerge after the fall of communism is likely to be greater in those countries that 
were more literate at the onset of communism, and thus where citizens were better able to make 
independent political judgments about the period of communist rule.21  It may also be that those 
countries with greater literacy were more successful states, for which communism was perceived as 
a greater setback.  This too could contribute to political alternation by making it more likely that the 
                                                 
20 In fixed effects regressions, GDP per capita enters contemporaneously. The results are very similar .   
21 See for example Besley and Burgess (2002).  
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communist elite would be replaced by a new generation of political leaders.  While we view the 
effect of literacy on the possibilities for independent political judgment as unambiguous, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that  whatever aspects of a society led to broader literacy in the pre-
communist period also led to better governance in the post-communist period.   
A second instrument that we use for political alternation is urbanization in 1989-1990.  
This is a plausible instrument because greater urbanization lowers the cost of voter mobilization, 
increasing the likelihood that several genuinely different parties will emerge.  However, 
urbanization can have this effect only if certain other conditions are present—such as the 
emergence of leaders who feel free to oppose the governing party—and so we view this as a weaker 
predictor of political alternation.     
Table A-2 (Appendix) shows the first-stage IV regressions.  As expected, the level of pre-
communist literacy is a strong predictor of cumulative political alternation, but the rate of 
urbanization in 1989-90 is not significant.  The F statistic regression is 11.5, which is significant, 
and Anderson’s identification test for the irrelevance of instruments is strongly rejected.  Based on 
Hansen’s J statistics, reported in Table 6, column 3, the null hypothesis that instruments are 
correctly excluded from the second stage regression is easily accepted. 
Column 3 of Table 6 shows the second-stage regression.  Instrumented political alternation 
is a significant predictor of rule of law score (p=0.00) and the effect is very large.  In this sample, 
one additional alternation is associated with an improvement of 0.71 points in the rule of law score.   
Recall that for the post-communist countries, the standard deviation in rule of law scores is 0.7, so 
the coefficient means that one additional alternation predicts an improvement in governance of one 
full standard deviation in rule of law scores in our sample. 
Earlier literature has used the number of years of communist rule as an explanatory variable 
(see e.g., Treisman, 2002) and shown that it is associated with a large change in the quality of 
governance in the post-communist period (with countries with longer years of rule having worse 
governance outcomes).  However, our results in both the OLS and IV regressions show that the 
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influence of the duration of communist rule is insignificant when alternation in included as a 
predictor in the regression.  A tentative conclusion from our results is that the mechanism through 
which years of communism matters is through its effect on political alternation.  When we exclude 
years of communism from the second stage regression (results not shown here), the estimated 
coefficient for alternation increases.  
   The coefficient for democracy is near zero and is statistically insignificant in two 
formulations, which is consistent with Treisman’s work using different measures of democracy.  
However democracy significantly reduces the quality of governance in the IV regression.  Thus, 
political alternation seems to crowd out the putatively positive effect of democracy.   It is more 
difficult to explain why greater democracy, for a given number of alternations in power, would 
make governance worse.  
Cumulative duration of war hurts governance:   the variable has a negative sign in all 
regressions.  In the IV regression, each additional year of war reduces the rule of law indicator by 
12 percent , or one-sixth of a standard deviation of rule of law scores in our sample.22   
As predicted by our model, as well as the literature on the natural resource curse discussed 
above, a higher share of fuel exports in GDP worsens governance.   The effect is particularly 
obvious in IV formulation where each 1 percent increase in fuel exports’ share in GDP reduces the 
predicted rule of law score by 0.14 points.  
As a robustness check, we present in columns 4-6 of Table 6 regressions with another 
measure of governance from the KKM database, “control of corruption.”   This measure is defined 
as “the exercise of public power for private gain.”  This measure  is also scaled so that the average 
and median  for the world are zero and the standard deviation is one, with a higher score denoting 
better governance.  We consider the control of corruption index a noisier measure of those aspects 
of the quality of governance affected by clientelism between firms and the government.  To curtail 
                                                 
22 War has a more pronounced effect when the regressions are run up to 2002 or 2003. As wars on the 
territories of transition countries have ceased, the impact of the variable on governance has somewhat faded. 
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petty corruption, much more than political change at the top is required.  However, the results, 
reported in Table 6 (columns 4 to 6) for the same three specifications as before (pooled data, fixed 
effects, and IV) are practically the same as when we use the rule of law indicator as our dependent 
variable. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
If investing in influence to obtain privileged treatment from the state is regarded like any 
other economic activity, then it is clear that businesses will engage in it more when the returns are 
higher.  There are many examples, in many countries, where it is a common knowledge that paying 
off influential politicians to buy property rights à la carte, and paying off judges to obtain favorable 
rulings, are more lucrative than seeking profits through strictly economic—not political—
investments.  The weak link in the chain from those who buy influence to those who dispense 
favors is that the latter cannot always “deliver”:  they may have lost political power.  And when this 
happens frequently enough, the returns to investing in influence decline and eventually fewer 
people engage in it.  Democracy and political alternation  thus play a key role in creating a situation 
in which the implicit contract cannot be executed although there is good will on both sides—
politicians and investors in influence.  We have explored this hypothesis for the post-communist 
countries during the early period of political liberalization, when political alternation was not 
routinized.  Under our hypothesis, the fact that alternation did, or did not, occur sent a powerful 
signal both to those who might invest in influence and to politicians, and changed their incentives.   
We find that more frequent political alternation is associated with better governance.  This 
result continues to hold when we control for a number of other plausible influences on governance 
(income, war, democracy, dependence on fuel exports, and number of years of Communist rule) as 
well as when we instrument for political alternation.  However, it does not hold in OLS regressions 
with fixed country effects.  This suggests that we are still at an  early stage of understanding the 
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systematic forces that explain the diversity of governance outcomes across the post-communist 
countries. 
A further question concerns the generality of our results across regions and periods. The 
case of the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is special in at 
least two important respects.  First,  the transition entailed a liberalization in political and economic 
spheres simultaneously, and second,  before the liberalizations, the set of private economic interest 
groups was very small.  In many postcommunist countries, there was a wholesale movement of the 
former nomenklatura into business, who were well-placed to establish a ‘special’ relationship with 
government as long as the former nomenklatura remained in government.  Thus, it might be that 
political alternation, and in particular, the first political alternation, is more important in the post-
communist countries than it would be in others following an initial democraticization.  On the other 
hand, it is a very general point that powerful firms will not have an incentive to subject protection 
of their property rights to a general apparatus (the rule of law) as long as they feel confident that 
they can obtain privileged protection from the state through their special relationship to the party in 
power.   
Our results suggest clearly that in a setting in which alternation in power has not been 
routinized, there may be a trade-off between the ability of a strong unified government and friendly 
legislature to push through painful economic reforms, and the corrosion of reforms that results 
when persistence in power of the reforming party widens corruption and lowers the quality of 
governance.  The long-term effects on governance may turn out to be more important than the 
short-term effects on reform.  One could argue that the best outcome for a newly democratizing 
country is that the government that has jump-started the reforms is thrown out of office, so long as 
its reforms survive.  Political alternation may sever the clientelistic links that have been created 
between the reformers and influential business circles. Then the reform process continues on a 
more level playing field.   
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Appendix A.  Ideological Classification of Parties in Post-Communist Countries and Coding 
of Ideological Alternation 
Here we explain the rules for coding post-communist ideological differences and 
ideological alternation. 
Ideological classification of parties. The criteria for distinguishing economic ideology 
(columns in Table 2) are as follows: 
• Far left: Favors total or extensive state ownership and control of the economy.  Market transition 
policies that dramatically weaken state control or unevenly affect the population are to be avoided. 
• Center left: Favors private ownership and control of the economy outside of government services; 
favors heavy income taxation to finance a generous, broad-based welfare state.  Market transition 
policies that dramatically weaken state control or unevenly affect the population are necessary, but 
should be cushioned by generous safety nets and transitional assistance. 
• Center right: Favors private ownership and control of the economy outside of government services; 
favors moderate income taxation to finance a limited welfare state targeting the poor and the 
disabled.  Market transition policies that dramatically weaken state control or unevenly affect the 
population are necessary.  In order to preserve incentives for structural adjustment, transition 
policies should be cushioned with only limited safety nets and transitional assistance. 
• Far right: Favors private ownership and control of the economy, including a large proportion of 
government services; favors only light income taxation to finance welfare policies targeting the 
disabled.  Market transition policies that dramatically weaken state control or unevenly affect the 
population are necessary.  In order to preserve incentives for structural adjustment, transition 
policies should be cushioned only with very limited safety nets and transitional assistance. 
The criteria for distinguishing national identity-related policy (rows in Table 2) are:  
• Extreme nationalist (top): The highest collective goals are protection of national security and 
national cultural identity, and the pursuit of national economic prosperity.  These goals justify the 
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use of discriminatory policies and, if necessary, force.  Ethnic minorities have no claim to equal 
rights, and/or neighboring territories containing large concentrations of the state’s dominant ethnic 
group should be incorporated.   
• Moderate nationalist (top center): The highest collective goals are protection of national security and 
national cultural identity, and the pursuit of national economic prosperity.  Ethnic minorities have a 
claim to equal rights as long as this does not jeopardize national security, national cultural identity, 
and economic prosperity.  There is no right to forcibly intervene in the affairs of neighboring 
territories containing large concentrations of the state’s dominant ethnic group, unless its political 
and cultural rights are seriously threatened. 
• Moderate autonomist (bottom center): Protection of the majority’s national ethnic identity and 
pursuit of collective policy priorities must be reconciled with protection of minority ethnic or 
regional identities and priorities.  This is usually to be achieved through the devolution of political 
powers down to the regional and local levels. 
• Secessionist (bottom): Protection of minority ethnic or regional identity and priorities cannot be 
reconciled with majority pursuit of national ethnic priorities.  Such minority protection can only be 
achieved through political independence of minority regions, achieved through secession, 
adherence to a similarly constituted neighboring state, or at a minimum, special autonomy status 
combined with constitutionally imbedded minority veto power over important legislation at the 
national level.   
Definition of ideological alternation.  An ideological change is counted as occurring in a 
given year if the ideology of the dominant leader, party, or party coalition has changed.  A change 
must involve a full transfer of the legislative and executive law-making powers to a new leader, 
party, or coalition of a different ideological persuasion, as defined by the 4-by-4 ideological 
classification of Table 2.  Thus, a country where the institutional has not changed but a continuing 
communist-era authoritarian leader “rebrands” himself with a center-left or center-right ideology—
such as Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev or Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov—is not counted as 
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having undergone an ideological change with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  On the other hand, 
when a communist party wins an initial, fairly conducted postcommunist election after having 
reformed itself into a center-left, European-style social democratic party—as the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party did in 1990—this is counted as an ideological change.   
 In democratic political systems, ideological control of all veto-wielding legislative houses 
must change.  We count change as occurring only if at least two-thirds of the seats of the new 
governing coalition are held by parties that were not part of the old governing coalition. In 
democracies with strong presidencies, the president’s ideology too must change.  An ideological 
shift in the control of some but not all of the relevant veto-wielding institutions is not counted.  On 
the other hand, if an ideological change in the control of all the relevant law-making institutions is 
completed over more than one electoral cycle, a change is coded as having occurred in the year that 
the change in control becomes complete.  
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Appendix B.  Data Sources  
 
The following data sources provided variables used in the paper: 
Governance:  The KKM rule of law index and the KKM control of corruption index are available 
at: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html.  
They are weighted composite indicators based on pre-existing sources.  The methodology is 
described in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) and on the website.  The data are available at 
two-year intervals for the period 1996-2002, and after that period, that is from 2002 to 2006, at 
annual intervals..  
Democracy:  Democracy is proxied by the variable Polity2, from the Polity IV database available 
at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ (updated in May 2008).    
Income per capita:  Proxied by GDP per capita. The data are from the World Development Indicators 
data base (accessed in May 2008); values expressed in 2006 PPP dollars.  
Political system and alternation:  These data are constructed by the authors, based on Horowitz 
and Browne (2005), as explained in Section II and Horowitz, Hoff  and Milanovic (forthcoming).   
Cumulative involvement in war:  Our measure is defined as the proportion of time the country 
was involved in large-scale military conflict since 1989 or, for the former Soviet Republics, since 
their independence in August 1991.  The data are created by the authors. 
Share of fuel exports:  Our measure is the share in GDP of exports of oil, natural gas, and gold in 
the first year that World Bank data are available (1996 or 1997).  The source is the World Bank 
Development Data Platform (DDP) database.   
Literacy in the 1930s: Percentage of adult population that is literate. Data from Darden and 
Grzymala-Busse (2006, p.113), Plestina (1992, p.181), and Rothschild (1974, pp. 37, 44, 92, 166-7, 
285, 327, 332, 359, 369).  
Urbanization rates in 1989-90:  Percentage of population living in urban areas. Data from World 
Bank (1996, p.175).  
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TABLE A-1.   NUMBER OF POLITICAL ALTERNATIONS BETWEEN THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM 
AND UP THROUGH AND INCLUDING 2006  
 
Number of political 
alternations 
Countries 
None Uzbekistan 
Turkmenistan 
Kazakhstan 
1 Belarus 
Tajikistan 
2 Russia 
Serbia 
Kyrghyzstan 
Armenia 
3 Albania 
Slovenia 
Ukraine 
Azerbaijan 
Georgia 
Bosnia 
Latvia 
Croatia 
Macedonia 
4 Bulgaria 
Poland 
Romania 
Estonia 
Czech republic 
Hungary 
Moldova 
5 Slovakia 
Lithuania 
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TABLE A-2.  FIRST-STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS USING AS INSTRUMENTS PRE-COMMUNIST LITERACY 
RATE AND 1989-90 URBANIZATION RATE (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: POLITICAL ALTERNATION)  
 
  Coefficient 
(p levels) 
GDP per  -1.966*** 
capita in 1990 a (0.000) 
War -0.061 
(cumulative) (0.238) 
Fuel/GDP in 1996-97 30.50*** 
 (0.000) 
0.172*** Democracy 
(Polity2) (0.000) 
Communist years  -0.351** 
 (0.017) 
Literacy rate  0.039*** 
 (0.001) 
Urbanization rate -0.015 
 (0.37) 
18.66*** Constant 
(0.000) 
F test of excluded 
instruments 
11.50*** 
(0.0004) 
Anderson canonical 
correlation test 
62.36*** 
(0.000) 
R2  
  
0.75 
 
N 183 
 
Note:  The results are the first-stage estimates for the second-stage regressions reported in Table 6, columns 
(3) and (6), respectively. Coefficients with three, two and one asterisk are statistically significant at 
respectively 10, 5 and 1 percent.  p values shown between brackets.  
a. In natural logs. 
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